Land & Water Law Review
Volume 25
Issue 2 Tribute to Twenty-Five Years of the Land
and Water Law Review

Article 15

1990

The New Wyoming Statutory Close Corporation Supplement;
Should Your Corporation Elect Statutory Close Corporation Status
James Bell Gilpin
William K. Rounsborg

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water

Recommended Citation
Gilpin, James Bell and Rounsborg, William K. (1990) "The New Wyoming Statutory Close Corporation
Supplement; Should Your Corporation Elect Statutory Close Corporation Status," Land & Water Law
Review: Vol. 25 : Iss. 2 , pp. 589 - 610.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol25/iss2/15

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Land & Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Law Archive of Wyoming
Scholarship.

Gilpin and Rounsborg: The New Wyoming Statutory Close Corporation Supplement; Should Yo

THE NEW WYOMING
STATUTORY CLOSE CORPORATION SUPPLEMENT;
SHOULD YOUR CORPORATION ELECT
STATUTORY CLOSE CORPORATION STATUS?
Effective January 1, 1990, Wyoming joined a host of states which
have enacted special legislation providing additional authorization or
regulation for close corporations, sometimes referred to as "statutory
close corporations." 1 The Wyoming Statute, known as the Wyoming
Statutory Close Corporation Supplement2 (Supplement) follows the format of the Model Close Corporation Supplement,3 and like other close
corporation statutes recognizes the special needs of the close corporation.
The Supplement provides Wyoming attorneys with an alternative
to the new "Wyoming Business Corporation Act" (Act), when incorporating family-owned or closely held businesses. While the Close Corporation Supplement is specifically designed for closely-held corporations, the attorney should compare its special provisions with the
provisions of the Wyoming Business Corporation Act, in light of his
client's needs, before deciding to incorporate under either the Supplement or the Act.
Prior to special close corporation legislation, when a lawyer incorporated such a business he did so under the general corporation law
of the state, turning out a small replica of a public issue corporation.
If the lawyer failed to recognize the special needs of the close corporation, he expended little effort to eliminate any of the traditional corporate attributes which were unattractive or undesirable to a small
closely-held business. Even if the lawyer recognized the special needs
of such an enterprise, he had to individually tailor the corporate form
to the needs of the particular enterprise, making incorporation less cost
effective for a small business.4
Initially, it is important to recognize the distinctions between
closely-held and publicly-held corporations. Close corporations are often
existing family-owned or closely held businesses which incorporate to
enjoy the benefits of limited liability, or the special tax advantages
provided to corporations.5 Closely-held corporations differ from publiclyheld corporations in that: 1) they have a relatively small number of
1. WYO. STAT. §§ 17-17-101 to 17-17-150 (1989).

2. Id. § 17-17-101.
3. 1989 Wyo. Sess. Laws 375.
4. O'Neal, Developments in the Regulation of the Close Corporation,50 CORNELL

L.Q. 641 (1965).
5. Hochstetler & Svejda, Statutory Needs of Close Corporations- An Empirical
Study: Special Close CorporationLegislation or Flexible General CorporationLaw, 10
J. CORP. L. 849, 853 (1985).
Election of close corporation status is distinct from election of S Corporation status under the tax code. Election of close corporation status does not automatically give
rise to S Corporation tax status. The drafters of the Wyoming Supplement, however,
restricted the number of shareholders in a close corporation to thirty-five in part to
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shareholders; 2) the shareholders are active in the management of corporate affairs; 3) there is no established market for the corporate shares;
and 4) the corporation's shares are not freely transferable. 6 Close corporations are often run in an informal manner and the shareholders
occupy overlapping roles serving as owners, directors and management.
Commentators have long recognized these distinctions and have advocated enactment of special legislation to deal with the unique needs
of close corporations.7
To deal with the special needs of close corporations, various states
enacted special provisions for close corporations.' Neither the substance
nor the form of these provisions is uniform.' Some states have adopted
provisions which are specifically applicable to close corporations and
are gathered in a special supplement. 10 Others have adopted provisions
which are dispersed throughout the corporate code.1 ' The Wyoming Supplement adopts the prior format, providing provisions, contained in a
separate supplement, which are specifically applicable to "statutory
close corporations."'"
Generally special close corporation provisions apply only to defined
"statutory close corporations."'" Various standards are employed to
determine which corporations are subject to, or may elect, "statutory
close corporation" status. 1 4 These standards often include the number
of shareholders, the presence of restrictions on the transfer of shares,
and the absence of any public offering of securities or a listing on a
accommodate the requirements of Subchapter S, 26 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1379 (1982 & Supp.
V 1988), of the Internal Revenue Code. See White, The New Wyoming Business Corporation Act, 25 LAND & WATER L. REV. 527, 556 (1990). The drafters of the Wyoming
Supplement were of the opinion that parties electing close corporation status would
also want to elect S Corporation status. Id.
There are significant differences between the eligibility for close corporation status under the Wyoming Close Corporation Supplement and Subchapter S tax status
under the Internal Revenue Code. For example, to be eligible for S Corporation tax
status, the shareholders of the corporation must be individuals, not other corporations
or partnerships. 26 U.S.C. § 1361 (b)(1)(B) (1982). Also, an S Corporation cannot have
more than one class of stock. Id. § 1361 (b)(1)(D). A lawyer should not rely on the Supplement independently, if the corporation also seeks S Corporation tax status. For a
complete discussion of the S Corporation election, see, e.g., L. BRAVENEC, FEDERAL TAXATION OF S CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS (2d ed. 1988).
6. Hochstetler & Svejda, supra note 5, at 852.
7. See, e.g., Israels, The Close Corporationand the Law, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 488
(1948); Latty, The Close Corporationand the New North CarolinaBusiness Corporation Act, 34 N.C.L. REV. 432 (1956); Oppenheim, The Close Corporationin California
- Necessity of SeparateTreatment, 12 HASTINGS L.J. 227 (1961); Bradley, Towards a More
Perfect Close Corporation- The Need for More and Improved Legislation, 54 GEo. L.J.
1145 (1966); Wolens, A Round Peg- A Square Hole: The Close Corporationand the Law,
22 Sw. L.J. 811 (1968).
8. 1. F. O'NEAL & B. THOMPSON , O'NEALS CLOSE CORPORATIONS §§ 1.14-15 (1987).
9. Id. § 1.15.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. WYO. STAT. § 17-17-103 (1989). A statutory close corporation is a corporation
whose articles of incorporation contain a statement that the corporation is a statutory
close corporation. Id.
13. Id.
14. O'Neal, supra note 9, at § 1.15.
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national securities exchange. 15 The Wyoming Supplement limits "statutory close corporation" status to corporations which elect such status, 6
and have thirty-five or fewer shareholders. 7
Once a corporation is subject to, or elects, close corporation status,
it is entitled to take advantage of the special provisions which are
tailored to meet its needs. These provisions allow increased flexibility
in structuring the corporation; provide greater certainty that agreements structuring the corporate operation will be enforced; reduce the
amount of drafting required to accomplish the desired management
and control structure; and recognize the needs of minority shareholders
to a greater extent. 8
Despite these special provisions, many corporations eligible for

statutory close corporation status do not elect such status. 9 One reason for this is the general flexibility and permissiveness now allowed
by most general corporation statutes. 20 Also, there may be more devel15. Id.
16. To elect "statutory close corporation" status, the corporation must amend its
articles of incorporation to include a statement that the corporation is a statutory close
corporation. Wyo. STAT. § 17-14-103(b). Both existing corporations, as well as corporations formed after the statutes effective date are eligible for close corporation status.
Id. If the corporation was formed prior to January 1, 1990, then the amendment must
be approved by all of the shareholders. Id. For corporations formed after January 1,
1990, the amendment must be approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of the shareholders.
Id. A dissenting shareholder is entitled to assert dissenters' rights under Wyo. STAT.
§§ 17-16-1301 to 17-16-1331. Id.
If a corporation elects close corporation status it must make certain disclosures.
The shareholders must receive notice that their shares are subject to transfer restrictions and that their rights and liabilities differ from those of other corporate shareholders. Id. § 17-17-110 (1989). The following statement must appear conspicuously on
each share certificate issued by a statutory close corporation: "[tihe rights of shareholders in a statutory close corporation may differ materially from the rights of shareholders of other corporations."
Copies of the articles of incorporation and bylaws, shareholders' agreements, and
other documents, any of which may restrict or affect the voting rights, may be obtained
by a shareholder on written request to the corporation. Id. at § 17-17-110(a).
Where a corporation issues or transfers uncertificated shares, it must send written notice to the shareholders containing this statement. Id. at § 17-17-110(b). The notice
is intended to inform the shareholders of the special characteristics of a "statutory close
corporation," and is essential to bind third parties who were not signatories to the original agreement. Model Close Corporation Supplement § 10 Official Comment (1984).
The Wyoming Supplement provides that: [a] person claiming an interest in shares of
a statutory close corporation which has complied with the notice requirement ... is
bound by the documents referred to in the notice. Id. § 17-17-110(d). "A person claiming an interest in shares of a ...corporation which has not complied with the notice
requirement ... is bound by any documents of which he, or a person through whom
he claims, has knowledge or notice. Id.
17. WYo. STAT. § 17-17-103(b) (1989). This differs from the Model Statutory Close
Corporation Supplement in which corporations which have fifty (50) or fewer shareholders are eligible for close corporation status. Model Close Corporation Supplement

§ 103.

18. See, e.g., MODEL STATUTORY CLOSE CORPORATION SUPPLEMENT, Introductory Comment (1984).
19. O'Neal, supra note 9, at § 1.15.
20. At least one commentator has suggested that the benefits provided by the close
corporation statutes may be achieved by the use of the general corporate statutes.
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oped caselaw under the general corporate statutes, providing greater
certainty as to the court's interpretation of the statute.
In light of the fact that Wyoming has enacted a new Business Corporation Act which follows the format of the Revised Model Business
Corporation Act, allowing greater flexibility, it is important to compare the provisions of the Supplement to those provided by the Act.
While the Supplement provisions are not designed to meet the needs
of all business organizations, its provisions offer specific advantages
to many closely held enterprises. This comment will set forth the Supplement provisions providing advantages to closely held corporations
and compare them to the provisions under the Wyoming Business Corporation Act. This comparison reveals the advantages offered by the
Supplement's special provisions to closely held corporations electing
close corporation status.
ELECTION OF CLOSE CORPORATION STATUS

Since "statutory close corporation" status is subject to election under
the Wyoming Supplement, the choice to elect such status should not
be made prior to comparing the advantages offered by the Supplement
with those provided by the Wyoming Business Corporation Act. 21 The
Wyoming Supplement is specifically tailored to meet the needs of close
corporations, and specifically permits some managerial structures not
permitted by the Wyoming Business Corporation Act.2 2 The advantages
of the Supplement can be grouped into three main categories: 1) provisions permitting flexibility in management; 2) limitations of the transfer
of stock; and 3) remedies available to shareholders.
PROVISIONS PERMITTING FLEXIBILITY

Close corporations are often operated on an informal basis. The
shareholders own the corporation and are also involved in its day to
day operation. Often, these shareholders are not sophisticated businessmen accustomed to corporate boardrooms or formal meetings. Under
these circumstances traditional corporate law strangles the management of a close corporation. To deal with this problem the Wyoming
Supplement includes provisions which specifically permit flexibility in
the management of a close corporation. These provisions explicitly
Shapiro, The Statutory Close Corporation:A Critique and a CorporatePlanningAlternative, 36 MD. L. REV. 289, 301 (1976). "[Tlhe general corporate law may actually aid

the unsophisticated practitioner in assessing and implementing the range of planning
options most suitable for achieving the client's objective" by providing a broad checklist of permissible provisions for inclusion in the articles of incorporation. Id.
21. The Act adopts the format of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act and
allows greater flexibility than the previous statute. See, e.g., Wyo. STAT. §§ 17-16-101
to 17-16-1803 (1989).
22. WYo. STAT. § 17-17-120 (a) (1989). All the shareholders of a statutory close corporation may agree in writing to regulate the exercise of the corporate powers and the
management of the business and affairs of the corporation or the relationship among
the shareholders of the corporation. Id.
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authorize shareholder agreements,2" and specifically allow the shareholders to eliminate the board of directors,24 corporate bylaws,2 5 and
annual meetings.26 The provisions also shield the shareholders from
personal liability if the corporation fails to follow corporate formalities.
A. ShareholderAgreements.
Proponents of close corporation statutes cite the statutes approval
of shareholder agreements as the chief advantage to electing "statutory close corporation" status.2 8 Shareholder agreements are intended
to play a role similar to that of a partnership agreement.2 9 Under traditional corporate law close corporations were required to operate within
statutory norms. This prevented shareholders from infringing upon the

directors' authority to manage the corporation.2 0

In small family owned or closely-held corporation such an arrangement is unrealistic.2 1 In these corporations, shareholder agreements

are often necessary to protect the financial interests of close corporation shareholders. While the shareholders of a public issue corporation

may readily sell his shares on the open market if the management fails
to use, in his opinion, sound business judgment, a shareholder in a
closely held corporation often has a large portion of his capital invested
in the business and no ready market exists to sell his shares should
he desire. Absent a shareholder agreement, specifically enforced by the
courts, a minority shareholder may find himself without a modicum
of control and at the mercy of an oppressive or ignorant majority.
23. Id. § 17-17-120.
24. Id. § 17-17-121.
25. Id. § 17-17-122.
26. Id. § 17-17-123.
27. Id. § 17-17-125.
28. Hochstetler, supra note 5, at 904. For a discussion of shareholder agreements
see Gelb, Close Corporation Control and the Voting Agreement, 16 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 225 (1981); Ballard, Arrangementsfor Participatingin CorporateManagementunder
the PennsylvaniaBusiness CorporationLaw, 25 TEMP. L. Q. 131 (1951); Cary, How Illinois
CorporationsMay Enjoy PartnershipAdvantages: Planningfor the Closely Held Firm,
48 Nw. U. L. REV. 427 (1953); Hornstein, Stockholders' Agreements in the Closely Held
Corporation,59 YALE L.J. 1040 (1950).
Examples of provisions which may be included in an agreement are: (1) The management of the business and affairs of the corporation in whole or part may be by or under
the direction of all the shareholders of the corporation or by or under the direction of
one or more shareholders or third parties selected by the shareholders; (2) One or more
shareholders may be given the power to dissolve the corporation at will or upon the
occurrence of a specified event or contingency; (3) The manner of exercising or dividing
voting power by the shareholders or directors may be established, and the use of director as well as shareholder proxies may be authorized; (4) The terms and conditions of
employment of any officer or employee by the corporation may be established; (5) The
identity of the directors and officers of the corporation may be established; (6) The payment of dividends or division of profits may be established; (7) Issues as to which the
shareholders or directors are deadlocked may be made subject to arbitration, or arbitration may be required for any issue of disagreement between a shareholder in his capacity
as a shareholder, director, officer, or employee and the corporation, or the other shareholders. MODEL CLOSE CORPORATION SUPPLEMENT § 20 Official Comment.
29. Hochstetler, supra note 5, at 904-05.
30. McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (Ct. App. 1934).
31. Hochstetler, supra note 5, at 853.
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The Wyoming Supplement allows shareholders to regulate the business and affairs of the close corporation or control relations among shareholders by written agreement.2 The Supplement explicitly permits
"statutory close corporation" shareholders to enter into agreements
regulating the exercise of corporate powers, and the management of
corporate business and affairs. 3 Shareholders may agree to eliminate
the board of directors, 34 restrict the board's discretion and powers,
treat the corporation as a partnership,3 6 or create a relationship which
would otherwise be appropriate only among partners. 7
The only requirement for a valid shareholder agreement is that all
of the shareholders must agree in writing. Unanimity is required due
to the unusual nature of an agreement that so radically alters the normal corporate structure."
While the Wyoming Supplement explicitly authorizes shareholder
agreements, the Wyoming Business Corporation Act does not. The validity of such agreements under the Act can be support by caselaw indicat40
ing a increased tolerance toward the agreements by the courts.
Although, in the past, courts looked upon agreements which violated
the statutory scheme with disfavor, they have since allowed greater
flexibility and latitude in the scope of shareholder agreements.4 1 Shareholder agreements which technically violate the letter of general corporate acts have been upheld in light of certain circumstances, i.e.,
where no apparent public injury results, in the absence of a complaining minority interest, and where no apparent prejudice results to corporate creditors.42
In addition to caselaw, the Act itself seems to support such agreements. Under the Act the board of directors has the power to direct
or oversee the direction of the business and affairs of the corporation,
subject to any limitationset forth in the articlesof incorporation.43 This
provision should authorize any variation of the statutory scheme as
long as a statement to that effect appears in the articles of incorporation.44 The Act does not, however, specifically prescribe the limits or
scope of such variations. Therefore, the interpretation and validity of
such agreements is left to the courts discretion.
While both the Supplement and the Act appear to authorize shareholder agreements, the Supplement explicitly approves such agree32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

WYo. STAT. § 17-17-120 (1989).

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 17-17-120(a).
§ 17-17-120(b)(i).
§ 17-17-120(b)(ii).
§ 17-17-120(b)(iii).
§ 17-17-120(b)(iv).
§ 17-17-120(a).

§ 20 Official Comment (1984).
See, e.g., Galler v. Galler, 203 N.E.2d 577 (Ill. 1964).
Id.
MODEL CLOSE CORPORATION SUPPLEMENT

42. Id.
43. Wyo.
44. Id.

STAT.

§ 17-16-801(b) (1989) (emphasis added).
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ments. This authority provides the practitioner with greater certainty
that drafted agreements will be construed as valid and enforceable by
the courts. Therefore, if the attorney wishes to use shareholder agreements to alter the control, structure or management of a close corporation, the Supplement offers a clear advantage - explicit authorization.
B. Elimination of the Board of Directors.
Structuring the management and control of a closely held corporation is important to protect the shareholders' financial interest. While
a shareholder agreement provides one means, the Supplement allows
other measures which are also valuable tools to manage and control
of directhe corporation. One such measure is to eliminate the board
45
tors or restrict the powers and discretion of the board.
Generally the business and affairs of a corporation are managed
under the direction of a board of directors.4 6 In the typical close corporation there is no division between ownership and management, characteristic of publically held corporations.4" The shareholders are often the
officers; and expect to manage the corporation through direct participation, rather than through a board of directors.48 Therefore, there is
no need for a board of directors.4 9
The Supplement allows the shareholders of a "statutory close corporation" to eliminate or restrict the powers or discretion of the board
of directors.5 1 If the shareholders desire to eliminate the board of directors, they must all enter a written agreement to that effect.5 1 In addition, the corporation's articles of incorporation must be amended provideffect that the corporation will operate without
ing a statement to the
52
a board of directors.
The Supplement provides that after the board of directors is eliminated, its responsibilities shift to the shareholders.55 Thereafter, all cor45. Id. § 17-17-120(b)(i)&(ii).

46. Id. § 17-16-801. The Act provides that "all corporate powers shall be exercised
by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of the corporation managed
under the direction of, its board of directors." Id.
47. Hochstetler, supra note 5, at 853.
48. Id.
49. Winer, Proposing a New York Close CorporationLaw, 28 CORNELL L. Q. 313,

316 (1943). A board [of directors in a close corporation] ...is generally but a superflu-

ous complication. On the one hand, five stockholders may well manage their own affairs.
On the other, once they create a board, the stockholders are shackled. Id.
50. WYO. STAT. § 17-17-120 (b)(i) & (ii) (1989).

51. Id. § 17-17-121.

52. Id. An amendment to the corporation's articles of incorporation eliminating
the board must be approved by all of the shareholders. Id. at § 17-17-121(b). If after
eliminating the board of directors the corporation decides to reinstate the board, it may
do so by amending its articles of incorporation. Id. at § 17-17-121(d). The amendment
must be approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of the corporation's shareholders. Id. The
amendment must also specify the number, names and addresses of the corporate directors or describe who will perform the board's duties. Id.
53. Id. § 17-17-121(c).
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porate powers are to be exercised by and under the authority of the
shareholders.54 The shareholders are authorized to manage the business and affairs of the corporation, 55 and any actions which previously
required director
approval must now be authorized by shareholder
56
approval.
The shareholders of a statutory close corporation may also enter
an agreement to restrict the discretion or powers of the board of directors. 7 Such an arrangement provides the shareholders with greater
control, while still maintaining the corporate form and may be desireable in a corporation with too many shareholders to effectively allow
the shareholders to run the corporation directly.
If the powers and discretion of the existing corporate board are restricted by agreement, then the directors are relieved of any liability
imposed by law. 8 To the extent that the agreement governs the powers
or discretion of the board, liability is imposed on each person who
assumes the board's power. 9 A shareholder, however, is not liable for
his act or omission, although a director would be, unless the he is entitled to vote on the action.6"
The Close Corporation Supplement allows shareholders to tailor
management patterns to meet the specific needs of a family controlled
business.6 1 The Wyoming Business Corporation Act also allows corporations with fifty (50) or fewer shareholders to eliminate the board of
directors by amending its articles of incorporation.62 The articles of incorporation must describe who will perform some or all of the duties of
the board. 3 This requires the attorney to draft provisions providing
that some person or group will perform the directors' duties, and to
what extent that person or group while performing the directors' duties
will be subject to liability. 4
Clearly, the Supplement provisions dealing with the elimination
of the board of directors are more streamlined. The Supplement specifically addresses who takes over the boards responsibilities and liabilities. The Act, on the other hand, requires that these subjects be
spelled out in the Articles of Incorporation, requiring additional drafting and increasing the possibility of error. If a corporation desires to
operate without or to limit the authority of its board of directors election of statutory close corporation status is the better alternative.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 17-17-121(c)(i).
§ 17-17-120.
§ 17-17-120(c).
§ 17-17-121(c)(iii).

MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.01 Official Comment (1984).
WYo. STAT. § 17-16-801(c) (1989).

Id.
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT

§ 8.01 Official Comment.
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C. Elimination of Corporate Bylaws
Another common requirement of corporate statutes which may be
eliminated in close corporations is corporate bylaws. 5 Corporate bylaws
are a set of rules which govern the internal affairs of the corporation
and regulate the management of the corporation. The bylaws may contain any provision for managing the business and regulating the affairs
of the corporation, not inconsistent with the law or the articles of incorporation. 6
In closely held corporations, where most or all of the investors are
active in the business and the corporation operates on an informal basis,
imposing the highly structured formalities contained in most bylaws
would be cumbersome. 7 Also, the provisions required in bylaws are
often contained in the articles of incorporation or a shareholder agreement. Requiring the adoption of bylaws where the provisions are contained in other business agreements would require unnecessary duplication.6
While the Wyoming Business Corporation Act requires a corporation to adopt bylaws,69 the Supplement provides the means to eliminate
this unnecessary duplication.7 ° A "statutory close corporation" may
dispense with the bylaws if the provisions required by law are contained
either in the articles of incorporation or a shareholder agreement.7 1
Once a "statutory close corporation" terminates
such status,72 however,
73
it is required to adopt bylaws immediately.
D. Elimination of CorporateAnnual Meeting
An annual shareholder meeting is another requirement of most corporate statutes which is not important in a closely held corporation.
The principal purpose of an annual meeting is the annual election of
directors and to vote on corporate business requiring shareholder
approval. Where there are one or two shareholders who are active in
the corporation's day to day affairs, a formal annual meeting is unnecessary. Also where the board of directors has been eliminated there is
no need for an annual election. Eliminating the annual meeting is
beneficial under these circumstances.
Under the Wyoming Business Corporation Act a corporation is
required to hold a meeting of the shareholders annually at a time stated
65. Under the Wyoming Business Corporation Act the incorporators or the board
of directors are required to adopt initial bylaws for the corporation. Wyo. STAT. §
17-16-206(a) (1989).
66. Id. § 17-16-206(b) (1989).
67. MODEL CLOSE CORP. SUPPLEMENT § 22 Official Comment.
68. Id.
69. Wyo. STAT. § 17-16-206(a) (1989).
70. Id. § 17-17-122.
71. Id.
72. Id. § 17-17-131.
73. Id. § 17-17-122(b). See, e.g., id. § 17-16-206.
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or fixed in accordance with the bylaws. 74 The Supplement, on the other
hand, allows a "statutory close corporation" to dispense with holding
an annual meeting, unless one (1) or more shareholders request a meeta date
ing.75 The Supplement only requires that the corporation set 76
meeting.

in case one of the shareholders demands an annual
For a corporation which desires to operate in an informal manner,
the Supplement provision is attractive, as an annual meeting is a needless requirement. If the shareholders desire an annual meeting the Supplement provides for such flexibility. Elimination of the annual meeting is an attractive option provided by the Supplement.
E. ProtectionAgainst Piercing the Corporate Veil
As has been described, close corporations often operate in an informal manner. The corporation is run as a family-owned business with
shareholders managing and operating the business. Often, these businesses are incorporated to provide the owners the protection of limited
liability. Yet, in some cases, despite full compliance with state law
governing the formation of the corporation, courts have imposed personal liability on the shareholders for failing to follow the requisite
corporate formalities.77
In many opinions, the courts focus on the failure of the corporation
to follow normal corporate routine and then conclude that the corporation is the "alter ego" or an "instrumentality" of the shareholders
and impose personal liability upon the shareholders.7" There appears
to be a substantial risk of imposing personal liability on the shareholders
when: shareholder meetings or directors' meetings are not held, decior comsions are made by shareholders as though they were partners,
79
maintained.
not
are
records
financial
and
corporate
plete
The importance of corporate formalities tends to create a trap for
unwary shareholders in close corporations. Shareholders in a small corporation often find managing the business a full time occupation and
they often put off or ignore the corporate formalities. The play-acting
aspects of corporate meetings, elections, and the like are often regarded
by the businessmen as rather insignificant.
74. Id. § 17-16-701(a). The failure to hold an annual meeting, however, does not
affect the validity of any corporate action. Id. § 17-16-701(c).
75. Id. § 17-17-123(b). If a shareholder desires a meeting, he/she must deliver written notice to the corporation requesting a meeting at least thirty (30) days prior to the
date set for the annual meeting. Id. § 17-17-123(b).
76. Id. § 17-17-123(a). Unless the corporation's articles of incorporation or bylaws,
or a shareholder agreement provide otherwise, the annual meeting date is set by statute as the last day of the third month following the close of the business year. Id.
77. Amoco Chemical Corp. v. Bach, 222 Kan. 589, 567 P.2d 1337 (1977); Ramsey
v. Adams, 4 Kan.App.2d 184, 603 P.2d 1025 (1979)(listing nonobservance of corporate
formalities as a significant factor for piercing the corporate veil). See also, Cataldo,
Limited Liability With One-Man Companies and Subsidiary Corporations,18 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB.

473, 482-83 (1953).

78. Bach, 222 Kan. 589, 567 P.2d 1337.
79. Miles v. CEC Homes, 753 P.2d 1021 (1988).
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Electing close corporation status may protect shareholders from liability based on the corporations failure to observe usual corporate formalities. Generally close corporation statutes excuse corporations from
observing corporate formalities. The Supplement provides that:
[T]the failure of a statutory close corporation to observe the usual
corporate formalities or requirements relating to the exercise
of its corporate powers or management of its business and affairs
is not a ground for imposing personal liability on the shareholders for liabilities of the corporation.8"
The purpose of this section is to eliminate the possible argument that
the shareholders in a statutory close corporation are individually liable for the debts and torts of the business because the corporation did
not follow the classic model of a corporation."
This provision, however, does not prevent a court from imposing
personal liability based on inadequate capitalization or commingling
of assets. 82 A court may still "pierce the corporate veil" of a statutory
close corporation "if the circumstances would justify imposing personal
liability on the shareholders [if] the corporation [was] not a statutory
close corporation." 3
In a situation where it is foreseeable that the corporation will be
operated on an informal basis, this protection is of the utmost importance. One of the main reasons for incorporating is the protection of
limited liability. If after incorporation, a court imposes personal liability upon a shareholder for failing to observe corporate formalities,
this purpose has been undermined. Therefore, in such a situation the
corporation should choose statutory close corporation status and enjoy
the protection from imposition of personal liability provided by the Supplement.
LIMITATIONS ON THE TRANSFER OF STOCK

A. Share Transfer Restrictions
Another advantage provided by the Close Corporation Supplement
is the automatic restriction on the transfer of shares.84 By their nature,
closely held corporations are owned and operated by the same
individuals. In order to maintain the ability to make business decisions
with the least amount of formality, the owners of a close corporation
need to be able to work together. Share transfer restrictions help insure
that the owners of a close corporation can decide with whom they will
work."5
80. WYo. STAT. § 17-17-125 (1989).

81. MODEL CLOSE CORPORATION SUPPLEMENT § 25 Official Comment.
82. O'Neal, supra note 9, at § 1.17.
83. MODEL CLOSE CORPORATION SUPPLEMENT § 25 Official Comment.
84. WYo. STAT. § 17-17-111 (1989).
85. 2 O'NEAL, supra note 9, § 7.02. O'Neal points out that, because of the close
nexus between ownership and management, decisions in close corporations are made
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Courts have recognized the desirability of share transfer restrictions in close corporations.8 6 In the past, however, courts have had to
determine how broad transfer restrictions were intended to be. In so
doing, courts often injected a requirement of "reasonableness" into valid
share transfer restrictions. 87 As a result, shareholders could not be sure
if their share transfer restrictions would withstand a court challenge.
The Supplement addresses this problem by prohibiting all transfers,
whether voluntary or involuntary, of "shares of a statutory close corporation... except to the extent permitted by the articles of incorporation ...

or a buy sell agreement. .

. ."I'

In addition, if an owner of

shares subject to the transfer restriction desires to sell his shares, he
first must offer the shares to the corporation. 9 These provisions are
designed to provide prohibitions that fit the needs of the "typical" close
corporation. They also facilitate alterations tailored to the special needs
of shareholders in particular situations. The attorney is not faced with
the job of drafting an absolute stock transfer prohibition, which most
courts would probably hold invalid. 90 Rather, his task under the Supplement is one of drafting the few, if any, narrow exceptions to the statutory stock transfer prohibition which the shareholders of the corporation may want.
It should be noted that certain transfers are explicitly exempt from
the prohibition. 91 It should also be noted, however, that these statu92
tory exemptions can be abrogated by the articles of incorporation.
often "with a minimum of formality" and without regard to the relative sizes of ownership interests of shareholders. "It is thus not surprising that shareholders in a closely
held enterprise usually desire to retain the power to choose future associates." Id. (footnote omitted). O'Neil points to specific examples justifying the need for control over
the transferability of ownership interests: where a shareholder is concerned about an
outsiders' integrity or business acumen; where shareholders are concerned about
unfriendly competitors gaining access to records and voting rights through the unrestricted purchase of shares in the corporation; where shareholders want to guard against
the concentration of control in any one shareholder; and where "the shareholders' active
participation in the business is necessary to its success." Id.
86. See, e.g., Gray v. Harris Land and Cattle Co., 737 P.2d 475, 476 (Mont. 1987);
see also 2 O'NEIL, supra note 9, § 7.02.
87. See, e.g., Hill v. Warner, Bergman & Spitz, P.A., 197 N.J. Super. 152,484 A.2d
344, 350-51 (1984) ("the unqualified restraint on the transfer of shares of stock is in
contravention of public policy and void"); Renberg, 667 P.2d at 469 ("[ajbsolute restrictions forbidding the alienation of corporate stock are invalid, but reasonable restrictions are not.").
88. WYO. STAT. § 17-17-111(a) (1989).
89. Id. § 17-17-112(a).
90. See 2 O'NEAL, supra note 8, § 7.06 n.2 and accompanying text.
91. WYO. STAT. § 17-17-111(b). The transfers not subject to the prohibition of §
17-17-111(a) include transfers: to the corporation or existing shareholders; to members
of the shareholder's immediate family; to the shareholder's personal representative;
or to "a trustee or receiver as the result of bankruptcy, insolvency, [or] dissolution. . ..
Id. Also, the restrictions do not apply: if the transaction was approved by all shareholders having general voting rights; if the transfer was made by merger, consolidation or share exchange (an exchange of existing shares for other corporate shares of
a different class or series); if the transfer was made by pledge as collateral if the pledgee
does not receive any voting rights; or if the transfer was made after the corporation
terminated its "statutory close corporation" statutes. Id.
92. Id.
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Thus, eliminating these exemptions will expand further the scope of
the statutory prohibition against the transfer of shares of a close corporation.9 3
Although the shares in a statutory close corporation are subject to
an automatic share transfer restriction, the shareholders do have the
ability to transfer their shares. A shareholder wishing to sell shares
which are subject to the share transfer restriction contained in the Supplement must first offer his or her shares to the corporation.9 4 To meet
this requirement, the shareholders must offer the shares to the corporation first by obtaining an offer to purchase from an "eligible" third
person.9 5 After receipt of the offer from the eligible third person, the
shareholder must deliver the offer to the corporation.96 This delivery
constitutes the requisite offer by the shareholder to sell all of his or
her shares to the corporation under the terms of the offer from the eligible third person.97 Following the offer of shares to the corporation, a
special shareholders' meeting must be held to decide whether the corporation should purchase the offered shares.98
93. Presumably, this would be a fairly easy task. While § 17-17-111(a) does not
automatically prohibit transfers to a shareholder's immediate family because of the
exception of § 17-17-111(b)(i), the articles of incorporation could specifically override
this exception and prohibit such a transfer merely by stating that the prohibition of
§ 17-17-111(a) will apply to transfers to a shareholder's immediate family, notwithstanding the exception of § 17-17-111(b)(i).
94. Id. § 17-17-112.
95. Id. § 17-17-112(a). An eligible person is defined as one who:
[i] . . . is eligible to become a qualified shareholder under any federal or
state tax statute the corporation has adopted and ... agrees in writing
not to terminate his qualification without the approval of the remaining
shareholders; .

.

. and

[iii]... [whose] purchase of the shares will not impose a personal holding
company tax or similar federal or state penalty tax on the corporation.
Id. § 17-17-112(b). The third person's offer must be in writing and state the offeror's
name and address, the number and class or series of the shares offered to be purchased,
the offering price per share, and other terms of the offer. Id. § 17-17-112(a).
96. Id. § 17-17-112(c).
97. Id.
98. Id. The offer constitutes an offer to sell all of the offering shareholder's stock
in the corporation, and therefore, the corporation must decide whether to purchase all
or none of the offered shares. Id. If the corporation decides to accept the offer, it must
deliver written notice of acceptance to the offering shareholder within seventy-five days
of the corporation's receipt of the offer. Id. § 17-17-112(d). The offer is deemed rejected
if this written notice is not given. Id. § 17-17-112(d). An affirmative vote of a majority
of the votes entitled to be cast at the meeting (excluding any votes associated with the
offered shares) is required for acceptance of the offer. Id. § 17-17-112(c). If the corporation accepts the offer, the offering shareholder must deliver the duly endorsed certificates to the corporation within twenty days of the date of acceptance. Id. If the shares
are not represented by certificates, the shareholder must instruct the corporation to
transfer the shares on the books of the corporations. Id. If the shareholder fails to deliver
the certificates, "[t]he corporation may specifically enforce the shareholder's ... obligation .... " Id. If, on the other hand, the corporation rejects the offer, the offering
shareholder, for a period of 120 days after the corporation receives the offer, has the
opportunity to transfer all of the offered shares to the eligible third person. Id. §
17-17-112(f). Again, the shareholder can only transfer all or none of the shares. Id.
In addition, the corporation may make a counteroffer. Id. § 17-17-112(d). If the
shareholder wishes to accept the counteroffer, he or she must give written notice of
acceptance within fifteen days of the receipt of the counteroffer. Id.
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Any attempted transfer which is binding on the third party transferee, and which is in violation of the statutory transfer provisions,
is ineffective.9 9 An attempted transfer which is not binding on the transferee, either because of lack of notice or because a court refuses to enforce
the prohibition, gives the corporation an option to purchase the shares
from the transferee under the same terms as he acquired the shares.' 0
In contrast to the automatic share transfer restrictions contained
in the Supplement, Wyoming's general corporation statute allows a
corporation to put restrictions on the transfer of shares, but does not
provide for the restriction automatically.' Instead, share transfer restrictions of a corporation organized under the general corporate statute must be drafted into "[t]he articles of incorporation, bylaws, an
agreement among shareholders, or an agreement between shareholders
and the corporation ....
While the Supplement's share transfer restrictions may not appear
to be significantly different from what is available under the general
corporate statutes, the lawyer must approach the problem of share transfer restrictions from different directions under the different statutes.
As stated earlier, under the Close Corporation Supplement, the lawyer's job involves the drafting of the desired exceptions to the statutory share transfer restriction and its exemptions. 3 His job under the
general corporate statute involves drafting share transfer restrictions
from scratch.'
The significance of this difference is apparent considering how courts
have treated share transfer restrictions. Generally, courts will invalidate absolute transfer restrictions, accepting as legitimate only those
restrictions which are reasonable. 0 5 This places upon the corporate
attorney the unpleasant duty of attempting to draft a share transfer
99. Id. § 17-17-113(a).
100. Id. § 17-17-113(b).
101. Id. § 17-16-627.
102. Id. § 17-16-627(a). Further, any transfer restriction under this statute is only
effective as against shares issued after the adoption of the restriction, unless the holders
of shares issued before the restriction is adopted "are parties to the restriction agreement or voted in favor of the restriction." Id. No similar limitation appears in the Close
Corporation Supplement.
103. Id. § 17-17-111. See also text accompanying notes 90-93.
104. WYo. STAT. § 17-16-627(a).
2
105. See 2 F. O'NEAL, supranote 9, § 7.06 n. and accompanying text; see also Gray,
737 P.2d at 476:
Due to their very nature, close corporations often utilize share transfer
restrictions. Because ownership and management are so intimately related
in such entities, shareholders in a closely held enterprise usually desire
to retain the power to choose future associates ....This interest, however,
must be balanced against the traditional right of free alienability of one's

personal property.
Consideration of these competing interests has led courts to sustain share
transfer restrictions which are deemed reasonable in light of all the relevant circumstances, but to invalidate absolute restrictions forbidding the
alienation of corporate stock.
(Citations omitted.)
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restriction which clearly and unambiguously covers every conceivable
transfer intended to be restricted. The attorney should remember that
courts generally will resolve an ambiguity in a share transfer restriction against the restriction and in favor of the free alienability of
property. 0 6 Thus, the attorney for the corporation organized under the
general corporate statute needs to avoid drafting a restriction which
could be
viewed as an absolute restraint on the alienability of prop10 7
erty.
However, the general aversion to restrictions on the free alienability of property has less significance in the context of a close corporation's share transfer restrictions. This is reflected in the legislative
decision to enact a close corporation statute which contains automatic
restrictions on the transfer of shares. This interpretation of the close
corporation supplement's share transfer restrictions is consistent with
the general purpose of close corporation statutes-to provide freedom
and flexibility to small, closely held corporations which previously were
governed by general corporate "statutes designed to meet the needs
of the publicly held corporation."' 1 8 The decision to include automatic
share transfer restrictions in the close corporation supplement should
be viewed as a legislative determination that transfer restrictions are
inherently reasonable in the context of a close corporation.
Although transfer restrictions are automatic under the Close Corporation Supplement, the restrictions are not absolute. There exist in
the Supplement exceptions to the automatic restrictions on share transfers.'0 0 However, the corporation is given the option of abrogating these
exceptions in the articles of incorporation. 0 Therefore, shareholders
could face a share transfer restriction which is even broader than the
automatic transfer restriction contained in the Supplement.
Given the purpose behind the enactment of close corporation statutes, any attempt to impose restrictions beyond those provided in the
statute arguably should not face intense judicial scrutiny. The same
106. See, e.g., Renberg v. Zarrow, 667 P.2d 465, 469-70 (Okla. 1983); Estate of Riggs,
540 P.2d 361, 363 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975); Thompson v. Anderson, 209 Kan. 547, 498 P.2d
1, 7-8 (1972).
107. The courts' general approach of viewing share transfer restrictions with suspicion could reflect a more basic concern with allowing too much flexibility to those
doing business in the corporate form. With no restrictions on shareholders' ability to
control the corporation and its ownership, the corporation begins to look more like a
partnership. While the Close Corporation Supplement has as one of its goals increased
flexibility, see supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text, absolute flexibility would blur
the distinction between partnerships and corporation to a point where the only identifiable difference, outside of the tax field, would be the existence or nonexistence of
limited liability. Thus, even under the Supplement, shareholders may be faced with
unfavorable responses from the courts to shareholders' attempts to maintain absolute
control over the ownership and operation of the corporation.
108. Empirical Research Project, Statutory Needs of Close Corporations-AnEmpirical Study: Special Close CorporationLegislation or Flexible GeneralCorporationLaw?,
10 J. CORP. L. 849, 854 (1985) (footnote omitted).
109. WYo. STAT. § 17-17-111(b).
110. Id.
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concerns of reasonableness of restrictions which have occupied courts
in the past1 1' should not threaten the validity of transfer restrictions
in the context of a statutory close corporation. The legislature has determined that broad share transfer restrictions are inherently reasonable in close corporations, and has given express authority to the corporation to make the statutory restrictions even broader.
B. Buy-Out Agreements
In addition to general share transfer restrictions, shareholders of
close corporations often make use of buy-out agreements to provide for
the compulsory purchase by the corporation of the shares of deceased
shareholders. The close corporation supplement has special provisions
relating to buy-out agreements. 11 2 If the articles of incorporation so

provide:
[Tlhe personal representative of the estate or the surviving joint
tenant of the deceased shareholder may require the corporation to purchase or cause to be purchased all ...

of the dece-

dent's shares or jointly owned shares or to be dissolved."'
If a close corporation elects to include this statutory buy-out provision,
is set forth or referred to
it can be modified only if the modification
1 4
in the articles of incorporation.

Buy-out agreements are especially attractive to close corporations
for one very important reason. Normally, there is no established market for the shares of a close corporation; therefore, the corporation or
other shareholders are the only prospective purchasers of the shares
of a deceased shareholder." 5 This is particularly important when the
deceased was a minority shareholder." 6 Like other limitations on the
transfer of stock, however, the drafting of a buy-out agreement (or clause
in the articles of incorporation) can be a complicated task" 7 absent the
statutory provisions contained in the Close Corporation Supplement.
By electing the stock buy-out provision of the Supplement, the shareholders can avoid the troubles of entering into a private agreement."'
Election also eliminates the problems raised when the shareholders
111. See, e.g., Hill, 484 A.2d at 350-51; Renberg, 667 P.2d at 469.
112. WYo. STAT. §§ 17-17-114 to 17-17-117 (1989).
113. Id. § 17-17-114.
114. Id. §§ 17-17-114(a) & (b). At least two-thirds (2/3) of the shareholders must
approve the inclusion, modification or deletion of the provision in the articles of incorporation. Id. § 114(c). For purposes of this provision, the term "shareholders" refers
to the holders of the votes of each class or series of shares of the statutory close corporation, voting as separate voting groups, whether or not otherwise entitled to vote on
amendments. If the corporation has no shareholders when the amendment is proposed,
it must be approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of the subscribers for shares, if any,
or, if there are no subscribers, by all the incorporators. Id.
115. See 2 O'NEAL, supra note 9, § 7.26.
116. Id.
117. Id. § 1.17.
118. MODEL CLOSE CORPORATION SUPPLEMENT § 14 Official Comment.
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have entered into a buy-out agreement, but have failed to agree on a
price formula, or have agreed on a formula but have left out other necessary terms.'19 These problems are avoided through the election of the
statutory buy-out provisions. The compulsory purchase right can be
enforced even if the shareholders have failed to agree on a formula for
determining the purchase price or have failed to provide other necessary information.12 ° Even if the corporation has elected to be governed
by the statutory buy-out provisions, a shareholder may waive his (and
his estate's) rights under the provisions.1 21
If the compulsory purchase right is provided for in the articles of
incorporation, a person wishing to exercise that right 22 must first
deliver written notice of the intent to exercise the right to the corporation within 120 days after the shareholder's death. 2 ' Within sixty (60)
days after the effective date of the notice, a special shareholders meeting must be held to determine whether the corporation should offer
to purchase the shares. 2 4 If it is decided that the corporation should

offer to purchase the shares, the offer must be delivered in writing to
the person requesting the purchase within seventy-five (75) days after
within
the effective date of the notice.2 5 This offer must be accepted
26
fifteen days after receipt, or it will be considered rejected.
The price and terms which are fixed or to be determined by the articles of incorporation, bylaws, or written agreement will govern the compulsory purchase.' 27 In the event that the corporation defaults on its
obligation to purchase the shares, the person exercising the compulsory purchase right may force a dissolution of the corporation through
state district court.'28 If the corporation rejects the purchase offer or
makes no offer, the person exercising the compulsory purchase right
may compel purchase through the courts." 9
119. Id.
120. WYo. STAT. § 17-17-116. In a proceeding to enforce a compulsory purchase right,
the court is directed to determine the fair market value of the shares in accordance
with id. § 17-17-142. For further discussion of share purchase rights, see infra notes
144-52 and accompanying text.
121. WYO. STAT. § 17-17-114(e). This waiver must be in writing signed by the shareholder. Id. A shareholder may also enter into a separate agreement providing for the
purchase of his shares at the time of his death. Id. § 17-17-114(f).
122. The persons who may exercise the right are limited to the personal representative of the deceased shareholder and the surviving joint tenant. Id. § 17-17-114(a).
123. Id. § 17-17-115(a). The requisite notice must describe the number and class
or series of shares, and must request that the corporation offer to purchase the shares. Id.
124. Id. § 17-17-115(b).
125. Id. § 17-17-115(c). Any offer made by the corporation must be accompanied
by corporate financial information. Id. This information must include a "balance sheet
as of the end of a fiscal year ending not more than sixteen (16) months before the effective date of the request notice, an income statement for that year, a statement of changes
in shareholders equity for that year, and the latest available interim financial statements, if any." Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. § 17-17-115(e).
128. Id.; see also id. § 17-17-116(a).
129. Id. § 17-17-116.
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In a proceeding seeking to compel purchase the court is required
to determine the fair market value of the shares by considering relevant evidence as to:
[T]he going concern value of the corporation, any agreement
among some or all of the shareholders fixing the price or specifying a formula for determining share value for any purpose, the
recommendations of appraisers, if any, appointed by the court,
and any legal constraints on the corporation's ability to purchase the shares. 130
After determining the fair market value of the shares, the court will
order the corporation to purchase the shares or cause the purchase of
the
the shares."' The court may also empower the person exercising
2
dissolved.
corporation
the
have
to
right
purchase
compulsory
While the Close Corporation Supplement, as discussed above, provides specific guidelines governing buy-out agreements, the general
corporate statute has no such provision. For a corporation organized
under the general corporate statute, buy-out provisions must be drafted
into the articles of incorporation, bylaws or separate agreements among
shareholders, or between shareholders and the corporation. These types
of clauses or agreements will be governed by the same provision of the
general corporate statute as are other limitations on the transfer of

shares. 13
This then raises the same problem discussed in the previous
section-lawyers are forced to draft buy-out provisions not knowing how
a court will interpret them. If the shareholders of a corporation
organized under the general corporate statute want to have a buy-out
agreement, that agreement likely will be drafted by the corporation's
attorney. Like share transfer restrictions, buy-out agreements are essentially restraints upon the alienability of property. As such, the corporation's attorney must draft them carefully so as to avoid a court determination that the buy-out provision is unreasonable.' 3 4
It appears that these provisions only make life easier for the attorney. However, these flexible provisions really inure to the benefit of
the corporation and the corporation's shareholders. In the case of corporations which "are not particularly complicated, election of close corporation status may avoid costs that would otherwise be incurred in
35
drafting a more complicated shareholders buy-out agreement."' Significant savings can be realized by avoiding the need to draft complicated limitations on the transfer of stock by taking advantage of the
130. See id. § 17-17-142(b)(i).
131. Id. § 17-17-116(b). The corporation may petition the court to modify the terms
of the purchase order based on a change in financial or legal ability of the corporation
or other purchaser to complete the purchase. Id. § 17-17-116(c).
132. Id. § 17-17-116(b).
133. See id. § 17-16-627.
134. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
135. 2 O'NEAL, supra note 9, § 1.17 (footnote omitted).
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provisions included in the Close Corporation Supplement. In addition,
with legislatively developed standards, courts are not forced to determine the reasonableness of potentially endless variations of attempted
limitations on the transfer of stock of closely held corporations.
REMEDIES

In addition to the provisions previously discussed, the Supplement
also contains significant remedial provisions.'3 6 These provisions provide remedies beyond those provided in general corporate statutes to
close corporations and minority shareholders faced with board deadlocks or "squeeze-outs" and other oppressive conduct of controlling
shareholders.' 3 7 They also will serve as detailed guides to courts faced
with disputes between a close corporation and its shareholders.
A shareholder of a statutory close corporation may petition the court
for ordinary relief,'38 forced share purchase," 9 or dissolution 4 ' if:
(i) those in control of the corporation are acting in a manner
that is illegal, oppressive, fraudulent or unfairly prejudicial;
(ii) those in control of the corporation are deadlocked in the
management of the corporation's affairs; or
(iii) grounds exist for judicial dissolution under W.S. §

17-16-143 .141

The relief applied is based on a progressive analysis. The court first
looks to ordinary relief and evaluates its adequacy. If ordinary relief
14
is inadequate, then the court may order share purchase or dissolution.
It should be noted that, in contrast to the Model Close Corporation Supplement position, these remedial provisions were not intended to be
exclusive.' 43
A. Ordinary Relief
If the court finds that one or more of the grounds listed above exist,
it may order such relief as it deems appropriate including, but not
limited to, those listed in section 17-17-141(a).14 The specific types of
136. Wyo. STAT. §§ 17-17-140-143 (1989).
137. See 2 F. O'NEAL, supra note 9, § 1.16; White, supra note 5 at 559; MODEL CLOSE
CORPORATION SUPPLEMENT § 40 Official Comment.
138. Wyo. STAT. § 17-17-141 (1989).
139. Id. § 17-17-141.
140. Id. § 17-17-143.
141. Id. § 17-16-1430 (1977).
142. Id. § 17-17-142(a).
143. See White, supra note 5 at 559.
144. Id. § 17-17-140(a). The court may order one or more of the following types of
relief:
(i) The performance, prohibition, alteration or setting aside of any action
of the corporation or of its shareholders, directors, or officers or any other
party to the proceedings;
(ii) The cancellation or alteration of any provision in the corporation's
articles of incorporation or bylaws;
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relief are listed in an effort to overcome the reluctance some courts have
shown in the past in ordering anything other than dissolutions and
buy-outs."'
B. ExtraordinaryRelief-Share Purchase
If the court finds that the ordinary relief is or would be inadequate
or inappropriate, it may order that the corporation be dissolved. 146 In
the alternative, the corporation or one or more of the shareholders may
purchase all of the aggrieved shareholder's shares at their fair market value. 4 7 If the court orders a share purchase, it shall: 1) determine
the fair market value of the shares; 148 2) specify the terms of the purchase; 149 3) require the seller to deliver the shares to the purchaser upon
receipt of the purchase price;' 4) provide that the seller has no further claim against the corporation; 15 1 and 5) provide that if the purchase is52not completed as to the terms, the corporation will be dissolved.1
C. ExtraordinaryRelief-Dissolution
The court may dissolve the corporation if judicial grounds exist
under the general corporate statute,'5 3 or if all other relief ordered by
the court has failed to resolve the dispute. 15 4 The court may consider

the financial condition of the corporation in determining whether to
(iii) The removal from office of any director or officer;
(iv) The appointment of any individual as a director or officer;
(v) An accounting with respect to any matter in dispute;
(vi) The appointment of a custodian to manage the business and affairs
of the corporation;
(vii) The appointment of a provisional director who has all the rights,
powers and duties of a duly elected director to serve for the term and under
the conditions prescribed by the court;
(viii) The payment of dividends; or
(ix) The award of damages to any aggrieved party.
Id.
145. MODEL CLOSE CORPORATION SUPPLEMENT § 41 Official Comment; see also Gruenberg v. Goldmine Plantation, Inc., 360 So.2d 884 (La. Ct. App. 1978); Harkey v. Mobley,
552 S.W.2d 79 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); White v. Perkins, 213 Va. 129, 189 S.E.2d 315 (1972).
146. WYO. STAT. § 17-17-142 (1977).
147. Id.
148. Id. § 17-17-142(b)(i). The court is required to consider the going concern value
of the corporation, any agreement fixing a price or specifying a formula to determine
the value, appraiser's recommendations, and any legal constraints on the corporation's
ability to purchase the shares. Id.
149. Id. § 17-17-142(b)(ii).
150. Id. § 17-17-142(b)(iii).
151. Id. § 17-17-142(b)(iv).
152. Id. § 17-17-142 b)(v). If the corporation is dissolved, the selling shareholder
has the same rights and priorities in the corporation's assets as if the sale had not been
ordered. Id. § 17-17-142(d).
153. Id. § 17-17-143(a)(i). The grounds for dissolution under the general corporate
statute are found at id. § 17-16-1430.
154. WYO. STAT. § 17-17-143(a)(ii).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol25/iss2/15

20

Gilpin and Rounsborg: The New Wyoming Statutory Close Corporation Supplement; Should Yo

1990

COMMNTS

dissolve the corporation, but may not refuse to dissolve solely because
155
the corporation has accumulated earnings or current operating profits.
CONCLUSION

The new Wyoming Close Corporation Supplement provides numerous advantages over the general corporate statutes for small business
enterprises which desire to incorporate. The special provisions contained
in the Supplement are not designed to be the answer to all business
organization questions, but may fit the needs of many closely held enterprises in Wyoming. The flexibility provided by the statute will allow
the unsophisticated business to conduct its operation without risking
loss of the limited liability which corporate status affords the owners
of a business.
Part of this flexibility is evidenced by the Supplement's explicit
acceptance of shareholder agreements. This provision recognizes the
reality that the small businesses do not and cannot operate in the same
manner as large publicly owned corporations. It also recognizes the
precarious position in which a minority shareholder may find himself
or herself. With explicit recognition of the validity of shareholder agreements, the Supplement provides the minority shareholder with what
may be the only possible avenue for protecting that which in many
instances is the shareholder's major personal asset. The Supplement
also allows for the elimination of the board of directors, corporate bylaws
and annual meetings. As the owners of a small business also generally perform the management functions, making decisions on a daily
basis, these formal requirements, if required, are of little substance.
In the past, by ignoring corporate formalities, owners of close corporations have set themselves up for personal liability. For corporations
choosing to elect close corporation status, the failure to follow traditional corporate formalities no longer threatens the limited liability
enjoyed by shareholders.
Much of the flexibility provided by the Supplement can also be
attained by a corporation organized under the general corporate statutes. However, the Wyoming Close Corporation Supplement provides
this flexibility at a lower cost. The Supplement accomplishes this cost
savings by eliminating the need for drafting certain complex provisions
for inclusion in the articles of incorporation, bylaws and agreements
among the parties. The Supplement's share transfer restrictions provide uniform protection to close, family-run businesses which want to
control ownership of the corporation. The buy-out provisions, likewise,
provide guidance in planning the disposition of otherwise unmarketable shares upon a shareholder's death. Finally, the Supplement provides expanded, detailed remedies, which give shareholders added security, and provide courts with statutory authority to order remedies
which they previously have proved reluctant to use.
155. Id. § 17-17-143(b).
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By recognizing the special needs of small business enterprises, the
Wyoming Close Corporation Supplement provides a viable alternative
to incorporation under the general corporate statutes. Incorporation
under the Wyoming Business Corporations Act will continue to be the
best choice for many Wyoming businesses. However, the Supplement
offers a special kind of flexibility of which a number of small enterprises can take advantage at considerably less cost and risk.
JAMES BELL GILPIN
WILLIAM K. ROUNSBORG
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